Renita Hill v. William Cosby, Jr. by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-14-2016 
Renita Hill v. William Cosby, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Renita Hill v. William Cosby, Jr." (2016). 2016 Decisions. 1087. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/1087 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RENITA HILL, an individual, 
 
         Appellant 
v. 
 
WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR., 
an individual, also known as BILL COSBY 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-01658) 
Honorable Arthur J. Schwab, U.S. District Judge 
______________ 
 
Argued October 7, 2016 
 
BEFORE:  SHWARTZ, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







George M. Kontos, Esq. (Argued) 
Claire McGee, Esq. 
Kontos Mengine Law Group 
603 Stanwix Street 
                                              
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not   
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Two Gateway Center, Suite 1228 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
 Counsel for Appellant  
 
 
Angela C. Agrusa, Esq. (Argued) 
Liner 
1100 Glendon Avenue 
14th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 
 
Brian C. Bevan, Esq. 
Efrem M. Grail, Esq. 
The Grail Law Firm 
436 Seventh Avenue 
Koppers Building, 30th Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
Marshall M. Searey, III, Esq. 
Christopher Tayback, Esq. 
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan 
865 South Figueroa Street 
10th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
 
Emily M. Smith, Esq. 
Quinn Emanual Urquhart & Sullivan 
711 Louisanna Street 
Suite 500 
Houston, TX 77002 
 





COWEN, Circuit Judge 
 
 
Plaintiff Renita Hill appeals from the order of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania granting Defendant William H. Cosby, Jr.’s motion 
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to dismiss her complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We will affirm.   
I. 
 According to Hill’s complaint, Cosby—“an internationally known comedian, actor 
and author” (A45)1—drugged and sexually assaulted her.  Specifically, the alleged abuse 
began in (approximately) 1983, when she was a sixteen-year-old high school student 
recruited by Cosby to co-host a children’s television program.  Cosby presented himself 
as Hill’s mentor and paid for her college tuition.  The alleged abuse ended around 1987, 
after she had completed her second year in college (at which time Hill cut off any contact 
with Cosby, and he stopped paying her tuition).  Hill claimed that Cosby would meet her 
in his hotel room and give her a drink containing drugs that affected her consciousness, 
memory, and perception (and when she indicated that she did not want to drink, Cosby 
would threaten to terminate “his purported tutelage” (A49)).  “While she was in this 
semi-conscious or unconscious state, Renita was sexually assaulted by Defendant 
Cosby.”  (Id.) 
 Hill allegedly did not come forward at the time of the abuse because she was too 
intimidated and afraid to do so.  While “Cosby was extremely powerful, wealthy and 
influential in status,” Hill “was young, impressionable, and seemingly powerless.”  (Id.)  
She also did not know that other women had allegedly suffered similar abuse.  For the 
next twenty years, Hill maintained her silence.  In 2005, Andrea Constand claimed that 
Cosby had drugged and sexually assaulted her.  In the civil lawsuit she filed against 
                                              
 1 “A” refers to the appendix, and “SA” refers to the supplemental appendix. 
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Cosby, Constand named thirteen other alleged victims, and, before her case was settled, a 
number of these women had come forward with their own accusations.  On or about 
November 13, 2014, Barbara Bowmen “penned an op-ed in the Washington Post titled 
‘Bill Cosby raped me.  Why did it take 30 years for people to believe my story?’”  (A50.)  
More accusers then came forward. 
Emboldened by these women’s example, Hill decided to share her own story.  On 
November 20, 2014, she was interviewed by Ralph Ianotti, a reporter with KDKA.  “In 
the interview, Renita revealed much of the above-mentioned fact pattern and explained 
that she felt compelled to come forward after hearing Cosby’s [sic] criticize the other 
woman who came forward.”  (A51.)    
According to Hill, Cosby retaliated against her and the other abuse victims by 
publishing statements designed to bring into question their honesty and motivations.  Hill 
highlighted three such statements:  (1) a November 21, 2014 statement by Cosby’s 
attorney, Martin Singer, Esq., given to The Washington Post for use in an article 
published on November 22, 2014 entitled “‘Bill Cosby’s legacy, recast:  Accusers speak 
in detail about sexual-assault allegations’” (“Singer Statement”) (A52); (2) a statement 
made by Cosby himself during an interview conducted on or about the same day by 
Florida Today (“Florida Today Statement”); and (3) a December 15, 2014 letter 
published by The Washington Post written by his wife and business manager, Camille 





According to Singer: 
The new, never-before-heard claims from women who have come forward 
in the past two weeks with unsubstantiated, fantastical stories about things 
they say occurred 30, 40, or even 50 years ago have escalated far past the 
point of absurdity.   
 
These brand new claims about alleged decades-old events are becoming 
increasingly ridiculous and it is completely illogical that so many people 
would have said nothing, done nothing, and made no reports to law 
enforcement or asserted civil claims if they thought they had been assaulted 
over a span of so many years.   
 
Lawsuits are filed against people in the public eye every day.  There has 
never been a shortage of lawyers willing to represent people with claims 
against rich, powerful men, so it makes no sense that not one of these new 
women who just came forward for the first time now ever asserted a legal 
claim back at the time they allege they had been sexually assaulted.   
 
This situation is an unprecedented example of the media’s breakneck rush 
to run stories without any corroboration or adherence to traditional 
journalistic standards.  Over and over again, we have refuted these new 
unsubstantiated stories with documentary evidence, only to have a new 
uncorroborated story crop out of the woodwork.  When will it end? 
 
It is long past time for this media vilification of Mr. Cosby to stop. 
 
(A51-A52.)   
In her complaint, Hill focused on the following excerpt from Cosby’s Florida 
Today interview: 
I know people are tired of me not saying anything, but a guy doesn’t have 
to answer to innuendos.  People should fact-check.  People shouldn’t have 
to go through that and shouldn’t answer to innuendos. 
 




So today I was informed of this radio station that is offering money for 
people to stand up and heckle in order to collect prizes and money. 
 
The thing is, these people are prodding and pushing people and asking 
people to have a frat house mentality.  Now suppose someone brings a 
weapon or decided to do more foolishness.  There will be announcements 
made and the stations made some disclaimers, but what if people don’t 
listen to what they said and they entice violence.  That’s not good for 
anyone. 
 
When you go to a civil rights march or something like that, at least there are 
meetings and some organization to it and people understand how to behave.  
There may be people coming to the show that don’t know exactly what to 
do; there is no organization to it all. 
 
I know people are tired of me not saying anything, but a guy doesn’t have 
to answer to innuendos.  People should fact-check.  People shouldn’t have 
to go through that and shouldn’t answer to innuendos. 
 
(SA2 (emphasis omitted) (citing A52).)   
 Hill alleged that Camille Cosby questioned the victims’ honesty by stating that 
“‘[T]here appears to be no vetting of my husband’s accusers before stories are published 
or aired.’”  (A53.)  “In an apparent attempt to cast further doubt on the honestly [sic] of 
Defendant Cosby’s accusers, Camille Cosby also compared the accusations to alleged 
rape accusations at the University of Virginia, which eventually were proven to have 
been fabricated.”  (Id.)  According to Cosby, his wife stated the following: 
I met my husband, Bill Cosby, in 1963, and we were married in 1964.  The 
man I met, and fell in love with, and whom I continue to love, is the man 
you all knew through his work.  He is a kind man, a generous man, a funny 
man, and a wonderful husband, father and friend.  He is the man you 
thought you knew. 
 
A different man has been portrayed in the media over the last two months.  
It is the portrait of a man I do not know.  It is also a portrait painted by 
individuals and organizations whom many in the media have given a pass.  
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There appears to be no vetting of my husband’s accusers before stories are 
published or aired.  An accusation is published, and immediately goes viral. 
 
We all followed the story of the article in “Rolling Stone” concerning 
allegations of rape at the University of Virginia.  The story was heart-
breaking, but ultimately appears to be proved to be untrue.  Many in the 
media were quick to link that story to stories about my husband – until that 
story unwound. 
 
(SA2-SA3 (emphasis omitted) (citing A52-A53).)    
 Hill filed a civil action against Cosby in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
of Allegheny County.  She asserted three claims:  (1) defamation/defamation per se; (2) 
false light; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (or “IIED”).  Cosby 
removed the action to the District Court on diversity grounds, and he moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2   
The District Court granted Cosby’s motion and dismissed Hill’s complaint with 
prejudice.  See Hill v. Cosby, 15CV1658, 2016 WL 491728 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2016).   
II. 
The District Court did not commit reversible error by granting Cosby’s motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).3  We begin with Hill’s defamation claim and, specifically, 
                                              
 
2 Meanwhile, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
denied Cosby’s motion to dismiss the defamation claims brought by three other alleged 
victims.  See Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015).   
 3 The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 The Court exercises plenary review over a district court’s order granting a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See, e.g., Fowler 
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  “‘To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358, 
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the Singer Statement.  Assuming that a reasonable recipient could read the attorney’s 
statement as offering an opinion—on the basis of underlying facts—that Hill lied, we 
nevertheless determine that Singer disclosed these underlying facts.  We also conclude 
that no reasonable recipient could interpret Cosby’s Florida Today Statement as implying 
the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts.  The Camille Cosby Statement similarly 
failed to implicate underlying facts regarding Hill’s accusations or to satisfy the “of and 
concerning” requirement.  Insofar as each statement was not capable of a defamatory 
meaning, the sum total of such statements did not rise to the level of actionable 
defamation.  Likewise, the District Court properly disposed of Hill’s false light and IIED 
claims.   
“‘[A]lthough a defamation suit has profound First Amendment implications, it is 
fundamentally a state cause of action.’”  Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 945 (3d Cir. 1985)).  Under 
Pennsylvania law,4 the plaintiff must show, inter alia, “[t]he defamatory character of the 
communication.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(a)(1).  If the court determines as a 
matter of law that the communication is not capable of having such a meaning, the claim 
must be dismissed.  See, e.g., Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                  
364 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  While 
conclusory allegations must be set aside, well-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true, 
and the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See, e.g., 
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.       
4 The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies, and we therefore must predict 
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule if faced with the issue.  See, e.g., 
Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  In making such a 
prediction, we must look, inter alia, to decisions of state intermediate appellate courts as 
well as rulings by federal courts interpreting Pennsylvania law.  See, e.g., id. at 216-17. 
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However, this non-defamatory reading must constitute “the only reasonable” 
interpretation of the statement for the court to dismiss the defamation cause of action.  
Zartman v. Lehigh Cty. Humane Soc’y, 482 A.2d 266, 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 
(emphasis in original).  A statement is defamatory in nature “if it ‘tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him.’”  Remick, 238 F.3d at 261 (quoting 
Tucker, 237 F.3d at 282).  A statement may be considered to have a defamatory meaning 
if its context creates a defamatory implication, “i.e., defamation by innuendo,” Mzamane 
v. Winfrey, 693 F. Supp. 2d 442, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citations omitted), but this concept 
of innuendo cannot be used to introduce new matter or to enlarge the natural meaning of 
the words used, see, e.g., Sarkees v. Warner-W. Corp., 37 A.2d 544, 546 (Pa. 1944).  
“‘[I]t is well settled that the use of catchy phrases or hyperbole does not necessarily 
render statements defamatory that would otherwise be non-actionable.’”  Remick, 238 
F.3d at 262 (quoting Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 1985)).  
Similarly, a statement must be provable as false to give rise to a claim of defamation.  
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).    
 “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.  However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 927 n.13 (3d Cir. 1990) (characterizing 
Gertz reasoning as dictum but recognizing that it is regularly cited).  Statements that 
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provide the facts on which the opinion-holder bases his or her opinion, known as “pure” 
opinions, are not actionable.  See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-23; U.S. Healthcare, 
898 F.2d at 927 n.13; Redco, 758 F.2d at 972; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. 
(b).  However, so-called “mixed” opinions, which imply—yet fail to disclose—the 
underlying facts may give rise to a defamation cause of action: 
Although there may be no such thing as a false opinion, an opinion which is 
unfounded reveals its lack of merit when the opinion-holder discloses the 
factual basis for the idea.  If the disclosed facts are true and the opinion is 
defamatory, a listener may choose to accept or reject it on the basis of an 
independent evaluation of the facts.  However, if an opinion is stated in a 
manner that implies that it draws upon unstated facts for its basis, the 
listener is unable to make an evaluation of the soundness of the opinion.  In 
such circumstances, if the underlying facts are false, the Constitution does 
not protect the opinion.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566A.  
 
Redco, 758 F.2d at 972; see also, e.g., Remick, 238 F.3d at 261 (“In Pennsylvania, an 
opinion cannot be defamatory unless it ‘may reasonably be understood to imply the 
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying the opinion.” (quoting Baker v. 
Lafayette Coll., 532 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. 1987))); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 
cmt. (b). 
 While Hill contends that the Singer Statement implied that she was a liar (and an 
extortionist), Cosby insists that this response by an attorney to serious public accusations 
of wrongdoing made against his client in the midst of a heated public dispute could not 
reasonably be understood to imply the existence of any defamatory facts.  We assume 
that a reasonable recipient could read the Singer Statement as proffering an opinion—
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based on underlying facts—that Hill lied.  Singer nevertheless disclosed the factual basis 
for his opinion.5   
“[E]ven if Singer’s Statement does imply Ms. Hill is a liar, it is still not actionable 
because it includes the facts supporting that implication.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 18 (citing 
Redco, 758 F.2d at 972).)  Responding to a media firestorm in which several women 
(including Hill) had made public accusations of serious wrongdoing against Cosby, 
Singer explained on his client’s behalf why he believed these accusations were nothing 
but lies:  (1) the alleged acts of abuse “occurred 30, 40, or even 50 years ago;” (2) “it is 
completely illogical that so many people would have said nothing, done nothing, and 
made no reports to law enforcement or asserted civil claims if they thought they had been 
assaulted over a span of so many years;” and (3) “[l]awsuits are filed against people in 
the public eye every day,” and “[t]here has never been a shortage of lawyers willing to 
represent people with claims against rich, powerful men, so it makes no sense that not 
one of these new women who just came forward for the first time now ever asserted a 
legal claim back at the time they allege they had been sexually assaulted.”  (A51-A52.)  
                                              
5 However, no reasonable recipient could find that Singer characterized Hill and 
the other alleged victims as extortionists.  It appears that the whole gist of the statement 
was to characterize the accusers’ claims as unsubstantiated, fantastical, absurd, 
ridiculous, and uncorroborated—in other words—as “lies.”  The attorney thereby seemed 
to call into question the veracity of the abuse allegations on the grounds that the alleged 
victims did not report or file litigation at the time the alleged abuse occurred many years 
ago, even though these individuals purportedly would have had no problem in obtaining 
legal representation to file a lawsuit against such a wealthy defendant.  Applying Florida 
law, the Massachusetts district court in Green determined that this Singer Statement was 
capable of a defamatory meaning because it could be read to imply that the allegations 
were false and without merit, but it did not consider whether Singer also implied that his 




Like the boxer’s letter terminating the plaintiff’s engagement as his special counsel at 
issue in Remick, 238 F.3d at 252-53, 261-62, or the 60 Minutes segment regarding the 
safety of multi-piece tire rims manufactured by the plaintiff considered in Redco, 758 
F.2d at 971-73, Singer’s disclosure of the facts supporting his opinion allowed the 
recipient to draw his or her own conclusions “on the basis of an independent evaluation 
of the facts,” id. at 972.  The Singer Statement thereby “adequately disclosed” the factual 
basis for the attorney’s opinion.6  Id.       
                                              
6 We acknowledge that Cosby unsuccessfully raised this disclosure argument in 
Green, but we have serious doubts with respect to the Massachusetts district court’s 
ruling on this point (which, in any event, is not binding on this Court).  Even though the 
Green court acknowledged that “[t]he truth of portions of the statement, such as the 
length of time between when the incidents allegedly occurred and the date on which any 
particular allegation became public, is uncontested,” Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 136, it did 
not really explain why (as Hill puts it) the Singer Statement “relies on undisclosed facts” 
(Appellant’s Brief at 11 (emphasis omitted)), see Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 136-37.  
 
Hill cites, inter alia, to a Pennsylvania Superior Court ruling concluding that a 
letter from an attorney requesting that the Pennsylvania Attorney General conduct an 
investigation into the actions of a city council member regarding the retention of special 
counsel for the city was capable of a defamatory meaning.  But she recognizes that this 
letter “set forth evidence that supported the defendant’s belief as to why he believed the 
councilman violated the statutes.”  (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3 n.1 (discussing Green v. 
Mizner, 692 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).)  In comparison, this Court has determined 
that significantly less detailed statements satisfied the disclosure requirement.  Remick, 
238 F.3d at 252-53, 261-62 (concluding that boxer disclosed factual basis for opinion that 
plaintiff failed to provide adequate representation by identifying five specific instances of 
such deficient representation); Redco, 758 F.2d at 971-72 (agreeing with district court 
that factual bases for all stated opinions were adequately disclosed in news story 
regarding multi-piece tire rims); see also, e.g., Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 361 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“We are not bound by the interpretations of intermediate state appellate 
tribunals, however, if other sources present ‘a persuasive indication that the highest state 
court would rule otherwise.’” (quoting U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 80 F.3d 90, 93 (1996))).   




 We further conclude that no reasonable recipient could read Cosby’s Florida 
Today Statement as implying the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts.  Cosby 
criticized a radio station’s attempt to get “people to stand up and heckle in order to collect 
prizes and money,” questioning whether thereby encouraging “people to have a frat 
house mentality” could lead to violence.  (SA2.)  While he arguably characterized the 
accusations against him as “innuendos,” Cosby did so in order to explain why he refused 
to offer any response of his own to these innuendos—and then invited the recipient to 
conduct his or her own investigation.  As the District Court aptly explained, asking the 
public to investigate and draw its own conclusions “is a far cry from labelling Plaintiff 
(and the other women who have made similar public assertions) as liars or extortionists.”  
Hill, 2016 WL 491728, at *6; see also, e.g., Purcell v. Ewing, 560 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342 
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (“The title of the posting (‘Look at the pictures’) and its opening 
sentence (‘If one looks at the photos’) invite readers to evaluate the photograph and form 
their own conclusions.”). 
 Similarly, we agree with the District Court that the Camille Cosby Statement did 
not constitute actionable defamation.  A defamation plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
the “application [of the communication] to the plaintiff” and “[t]he understanding by the 
recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
8343(a)(3), (5).  “This statement targets the media as much, and arguably more so, than 
the accusers, by claiming that the media failed to properly source or ‘vet’ Plaintiff’s and 
the other women’s stories before publishing them.”  Hill, 2016 WL 491728, at *6.  In 
fact, the Camille Cosby Statement—unlike the Singer Statement and the Florida Today 
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Statement—was made more than a month after Hill herself had come forward with her 
accusations against Cosby.  Camille Cosby went on to refer to what Hill calls an 
infamous scandal involving false rape allegations at the University of Virginia, but we 
believe that no reasonable recipient could find that this final statement implied the 
existence of specific undisclosed facts known to Camille Cosby regarding Hill’s 
allegations against her husband.  After all, this recipient would know that Camille Cosby 
was not only Cosby’s business manager.  She was also his wife, and it is understandable 
that someone would defend his or her spouse against public accusations of wrongdoing 
without thereby implicating any specific facts regarding a particular accusation. 
 According to Hill, the three statements, when combined together, “demonstrate 
their defamatory nature based upon undisclosed, false facts.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 19 
(emphasis omitted).)  We do not agree.  Insofar as each statement (which was made by 
different people at different times) was not capable of a defamatory meaning, the sum 
total of these statements likewise did not rise to the level of actionable defamation.    
 Finally, the District Court appropriately disposed of Hill’s non-defamation causes 
of action.  “Plaintiff agrees with the court below that Pennsylvania courts apply the same 
analysis for both defamation and false light.”  (Id. at 23.)  Thus, because this Court has 
determined that none of the statements were defamatory in nature, her false light claim 
fails.  Hill further acknowledges that “Pennsylvania has yet to uphold such an IIED claim 
in a defamation context.”  (Id. at 29.)  Even if we were inclined to agree with Hill that an 
IIED claim could be based on allegedly defamatory language, we refuse to allow such a 
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novel claim to go forward “after concluding as a matter of law that the language itself is 
not defamatory.”7  Hill, 2016 WL 491728, at *9.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
Cosby’s motion to dismiss.        
                                              
7  The District Court did not commit reversible error by dismissing Hill’s 
complaint with prejudice.  Hill acknowledges that leave to amend should be granted 
“[u]nless amendment would be futile.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 9 (citing Chemtech Int’l, 
Inc. v. Chem. Injection Techs., Inc., 170 F. App’x 805 (3d Cir. 2006)).)  There is no 
indication that the various deficiencies identified by this Court could be remedied in an 
amended complaint.  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 
(holding that futility is a proper justification for denying leave to amend).   
